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Brooklyn, November 6, 2005:
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What’s the deal?
“All philosophers, of every school, imagine that causation is
one of the fundamental axioms or postulates of science, yet,
oddly enough, in advanced sciences such as gravitational
astronomy, the word ‘cause’ never occurs ... The law of
causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among
philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the
monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no
harm.”†
†B. Russell, “On the Notion of Cause”, Proc. Arist. Soc. 13(1913) 1–26.
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Russell’s point:
It’s all bricks, no cement! *
* Hat-tip to:
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Why are causal laws essential?
Cartwright’s example—the letter from TIAA Life Insurance:
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EDT v CDT
Cartwright’s argument parallels a popular conclusion about
decision theory:
Evidential decision theory (EDT) yields the wrong
prescriptions, when there are spurious correlations.
Rational decision needs to track causal correlations—we
need a causal decision theory (CDT).
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Essential causation?
The general claim: Agent’s need to represent their
environment in causal terms – there is a distinction crucial to
rational decision that otherwise “goes missing”.
However, in the same volume of Nouˆs as Cartwright’s (1979)
paper – from an author at the same institution – we also find
this . . .
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Perry’s argument:
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The essential indexical
Perry’s conclusion: Agent’s need to represent their world in
indexical terms – there are distinctions crucial to the
explanation of behaviour that otherwise “go missing”.
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However . . .
In this case there’s little temptation to conclude that
there’s an objective feature of the world that an agent
needs indexicals to represent.
Instead, we explain the essential indexical in terms of the
the nature of the agent’s perspective.
We explain why agents need to “represent” the world in
indexical terms in terms of features of the agent and
relational aspects of their situation in the world.
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Roughly:
Action requires that agents
position themselves on their
own maps of the world—and
this is the job of indexical
thoughts, or “representations”.
[NB for future reference: we have
no trouble mapping ourselves in
imagination into places and times
and even selves that we never
occupy, and perhaps couldn’t
possibly occupy.]
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Our question:
Why not do the same in Cartwright’s case?
In other words, why not try to argue that the need for
causal “representations” is a product of some element of an
agent’s situation, rather than of an objective element of the
world?
This shift in focus would be an example of what (loosely
following Kant) we can call the Copernican strategy.
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The Copernican strategy:
Try to account for puzzling features of the “manifest
image” by showing how they are a product of a
distinctive perspective on the kind of world described
in the “scientific image”.
“When a ship is floating calmly along, the
sailors see its motion mirrored in everything
outside, while . . . they suppose that they are
stationary . . . . In the same way, the motion
of the earth can unquestionably produce the
impression that the entire universe is
rotating.”
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Copernican explanations
Advantages:
Metaphysical economy.
Epistemological simplicity.
Examples:
The moral case: expressivism doesn’t need “queer” moral
properties, or mysterious moral intuitions to reveal them.
Chance: subjectivists have a much easier job accounting for
the Principal Principle.
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It isn’t always easy being Copernicus
Contrast these cases:
The case of “here” and “now” and other indexicals.
The case of “the flow of time” and “the moving present”.
The genealogy of the latter is still
quite obscure . . . but most of us are
Copernicans—we think it is there to
be found.
Even here, of course, there are still
some die-hard Ptolemaics . . .
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Next question:
What does the Copernican strategy look like, in the case of
causation?
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The aim:
Use an ontology containing nothing but “laws of
association”.
Attribute the residue “to our perspective” – i.e., try to
show that the need to add “causal laws” to the map is a
product of our relation to the bare Humean world.
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Interventionism
Recent work by Pearl, Woodward and others
suggests
1 That interventions are at the core of an
understanding of causality
2 That the “Ptolemaic” view of interventions
is problematic.
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Wisdom of Pearl:
“If you wish to include the entire universe in the model, causality
disappears because interventions disappear – the manipulator
and the manipulated loose [sic] their distinction. However,
scientists rarely consider the entirety of the universe as an object
of investigation. In most cases the scientist carves a piece from
the universe and proclaims that piece in – namely, the focus of
investigation. The rest of the universe is then considered out or
background and is summarized by what we call boundary
conditions. This choice of ins and outs creates asymmetry in the
way we look at things and it is this asymmetry that permits us to
talk about “outside intervention” and hence about causality and
cause–effect directionality.” [Judea Pearl, Causality, 349–350]
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The Copernican question:
Question: From what perspective is it appropriate to
represent one’s environment in terms of interventions?
The answer we’re looking for: From the perspective of
an agent . . . but note that there’s a two-way methodology here
– knowing that the goal is to explain why we represent things in
terms of interventions can throw light on the internal structure
of agents. (Cf. again the Copernican analogy.)
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Some things we want to explain:
1 The “contingency” or “unpredictability” of interventions.
2 The dependencies that survive despite this “contingency”.
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“In a sense my present action is an
ultimate and the only ultimate
Contingencycontingency.”
– F. P. Ramsey (1929).
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“[A] rational agent, while in the
midst of her deliberations, is in a
position to legitimately ignore any
evidence she might possess about
what she is likely to do.”
– James Joyce (2004).
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Jim Joyce’s version:
‘[M]any decision theorists (both evidential and causal) have
suggested that free agents can legitimately ignore evidence
about their own acts. Judea Pearl (a causalist) has written
that while “evidential decision theory preaches that one
should never ignore genuine statistical evidence . . . [but]
actions – by their very definition – render such evidence
irrelevant to the decision at hand, for actions change the
probabilities that acts normally obey.” (2000, p. 109)’
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Joyce (continued):
“Pearl took this point to be so important that he rendered
it in verse:
Whatever evidence an act might provide
On facts that precede the act,
Should never be used to help one decide
On whether to choose that same act.”
Comment: This verse seems to make a different point. Effectively, it
is the prescription that Cartwright and the Causalists think we need,
to avoid Evidentialist mistakes. It isn’t Ramsey’s principle, which is
better put thus:
The evidence my choice to you would provide
On earlier matters of fact,
Is irrelevant to me as I try to decide
On whether to perform an act.
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Joyce (continued):
‘Huw Price (an evidentialist) has expressed similar
sentiments: “From the agent’s point of view contemplated
actions are always considered to be sui generis, uncaused by
external factors . . . This amounts to the view that free
actions are treated as probabilistically independent of
everything except their effects.” (1993, p. 261) A view
somewhat similar to Price’s can be found in Hitchcock
(1996).’
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Joyce (continued):
“These claims are basically right: a rational agent, while in
the midst of her deliberations, is in a position to
legitimately ignore any evidence she might possess about
what she is likely to do. She can readjust her probabilities
for her currently available acts at will, including her
probabilities for acts conditional on states of the world.”
Comments:
Better to say “has no evidence” than “can legitimately
ignore any evidence” – if you can ignore it, it ain’t evidence
(by the Principle of Total Evidence!)
The last claim must be wrong . . .
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Why?
Joyce claims that an agent “can readjust her probabilities for
her currently available acts at will, including her probabilities
for acts conditional on states of the world.”
But imagine I’m deciding whether to take the plunge (into a
river, say): I can’t readjust the probability that I do so
conditional on getting wet in a fraction of a second’s time,
because that’s precisely the inverse of the “causal” conditional
probability on which my choice depends. (If I couldn’t hold
that fixed, I’d be leaping in the dark, so to speak.)
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Getting it right (I)
A better attempt at what Joyce wants: “An agent can
readjust her probabilities for her currently available acts at
will, including her probabilities for acts conditional on
known states of the world.”
This still isn’t quite right, because it is not only known
states that need to be included – we need the unknown
ones, too, in so far as they are not effects.
But let’s come back to that – first, let’s fix the first bit.
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Getting it right (II)
Joyce: “An agent can readjust her probabilities for her
currently available acts at will.”
This is sort of right, but Joyce doesn’t nail the crucial
point: the only way we settle or adjust probabilities of our
own acts is by acting!
[Joyce again: “The beliefs of Newcomb deciders are not
constrained by the evidence at their disposal; in the context of
deliberation, free agents can believe what they want about their
current acts because such beliefs provide their own
justification.”]
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What we need: An explanation of why an agent’s own choices
are “epistemically unconstrained”, from her point of view.
Hypothesis: it is a result of the fact that – at the
moment of choice – there is no gap between the
“representing” and the “doing” of the act: “This is what I
do” is both a doing and a judgement about my doing.
Because the judgement is the act, it is necessarily
self-confirming, and hence alethically unconstrained –
epistemically “degenerate”.
Claim: this epistemic degeneracy is the source and essence
of Ramsey’s “ultimate contingency”.
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In other words:
Our claim is that Ramsey’s contingency is a consequence of the
fact that agents can’t put their own actions on their evolving
“maps” of their environment, except by making a choice.
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Next issue:
How do agents come to see their actions as “linked” to
consequences?
Here, too (we think), the key is in Ramsey. There are two main
ingredients:
The recognition that lawlike generalisations are effectively
map-making rules – rules that govern our construction of
maps of our actual environment.
The realisation that causal laws are simply a special case –
an essentially indexical case!
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Laws of association as map-making rules
To accept as a law that Xs are associated with Ys is to
accept that whenever you put an X on your map, you
should put a Y there, too.†
†Note obvious generalisation for probabilistic case.
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Causal laws as special case
We need a special rule for the case in which the antecedent
X is one of our own actions, because – as we’ve just noted –
not all laws of association are reliable, from our own
epistemic standpoint, in this case.
Discovering those generalisations that are reliable in this
case – building the “meta-map” that encodes this
information – is discovering the causal laws.
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Causation as an essential indexical (I)
Ramsey’s contingency is an indexical contingency (as his
own formulation recognises!)
The special character of causal associations reflects the
special character of an agent’s epistemic relation to her
own actions. When we describe the world in causal terms,
we are doing something closely analogous to describing it
in indexical terms – and in both cases, the need to do so
stems from the need to put our own “location” on the
objective map.
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Causation as an essential indexical (II)
The indexicality is harder to see in case of causation than
for familiar indexicals (“here”, “now”, “I”), but this is
because in most respects most of us share the same
viewpoint – we all put our causal red dots on the map in
the same place, as it were.
But it is highlighted by the temporal orientation of
causation, because in this case we can make sense of
creatures who see things differently.
Jenann Ismael & Huw Price Two Bits of Nouˆs From 1979
Brooklyn (2005)
Stanford (1979)
Nuremberg (1543)
Cambridge (1929)
Lisbon (2005)
The epistemology of causal correlation
Experience and experimentation
The difference between buses & trams
1 Brooklyn (2005)
2 Stanford (1979)
3 Nuremberg (1543)
4 Cambridge (1929)
5 Lisbon (2005)
Jenann Ismael & Huw Price Two Bits of Nouˆs From 1979
Brooklyn (2005)
Stanford (1979)
Nuremberg (1543)
Cambridge (1929)
Lisbon (2005)
The epistemology of causal correlation
Experience and experimentation
The difference between buses & trams
Appendix—the epistemology of causal correlation
The task: To explain how we discover these “indexical laws” –
and why we don’t have to count the spurious correlations.
The strategy:
Describe an epistemic methodology.
Postulate that anything that survives as a correlation in
the light of this methodology counts as “causal”, and that
nothing else does.
Show why the spurious cases don’t survive, unless we have
some sort of funny causation (e.g., backward causation), in
which case they are not problematic.
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Lisbon, 2005—a bus or a tram?
Question: What happens if we move the handle, or turn the wheel?
Answer: Try it and see!
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“Try it and see” is a method for generating causal
hypotheses. We seem to be programmed to construct our
meta-maps on the basis of this kind evidence – very little
of it, apparently, in some cases.
Such evidence is defeasible, of course. (Perhaps the tram is
guided by hidden cables, which just happen to match our
wiggles. If so, then we’ll wrongly believe that it is a bus.)
But we can be wrong about what time it is now, too! The
fact that our maps (or our meta-maps) can be wrong
doesn’t show that they’re not indexical.
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Notes
Experimentation is not just observation – more on this
later (after the next talk).
Often we can’t experiment, but we can extend our maps by
exploiting the symmetries of the laws of association. (We
can’t turn a tram into a bus by moving it from Lisbon to
Sydney, or by making it bigger!)
As in the original indexical case, we can use our
imagination.
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Spurious correlations?
A challenge to Ptolemaics: Produce a case in which the
method of “try it and see” reveals a correlation, in which it is
clearly irrational to “one-box” – i.e., to be guided by those
correlations, for decision purposes.
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[Movie finale not available in this version – sorry!]
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